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Abstract Insider threat detection is an emergent concern for industries and
governments due to the growing number of attacks in recent years. Several
Machine Learning (ML) approaches have been developed to detect insider
threats, however, they still suffer from a high number of false alarms. None
of those approaches addressed the insider threat problem from the perspec-
tive of stream mining data where a concept drift or an outlier is an indi-
cation of an insider threat. An outlier refers to anomalous behaviour that
deviates from the normal baseline of community’s behaviour and is the fo-
cus of this paper. To address the shortcoming of existing approaches and
realise a novel solution to the problem, we present RandSubOut (Random
Subspace Outliers) approach for insider threat detection over real-time data
streaming. RandSubOut allows the detection of insider threats represented
as localised outliers in random feature subspaces, which would not be de-
tected over the whole feature space, due to dimensionality. We evaluated the
presented approach as an ensemble of established distance-based outlier de-
tection methods, namely, Micro-cluster-based Continuous Outlier Detection
(MCOD) and Anytime OUTlier detection (AnyOut), according to evaluation
measures including True Positive (TP) and False Positive (FP).
1 Introduction
Insider threat detection is an emergent concern for academia, industries, and
governments due to the growing number of attacks in recent years. Insiders
Diana Haidar
Birmingham City University, Birmingham, UK e-mail: diana.haidar@bcu.ac.uk
Mohamed Medhat Gaber
Birmingham City University, Birmingham, UK e-mail: mohamed.gaber@bcu.ac.uk
Diana Haidar and Mohamed Medhat Gaber
are current or former employees, contractors or business partners of an organ-
isation who have authorised access to the network system, data, or sensitive
information (e.g. trade secrets, organisation plans, and Intellectual Property)
[15]. Their authorised access makes the organisation prone to insider threats
that could have a vital negative impact on the system. Insider threats can be
categorised into two groups, which are malicious insider threats and uninten-
tional insider threats. Malicious insider threats are caused by insiders who
exploit their privileges with the intention to compromise the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the system and data. Their motivation would be
to disclose or modify organisation’s information for financial gain, for the
advantage of a competitor company with the promise of a higher-paying job,
or for revenge [4]. Unintentional insider threats are caused by insiders who
accidentally harm the organisation’s assets. This includes human mistakes
and errors that are the result of faulty system design or the non-malicious
negligence of insiders.
Legg et al. [14] stated that according to the 2011 Cybersecurity Watch
Survey, 58% of attacks are associated outsiders, while 21% are associated in-
siders. However, the risk of insider attacks is much more than that of outsider
attacks, because insiders have authorised access to sensitive data that could
be used to damage the company’s reputation, brand integrity, or customer
confidence. An important example is the insider attack of Edward Snowden
[21], a contractor hired by the National Security Agency (NSA). Snowden,
in May 2013, stole approximately 1.7 million documents containing secret
data from the NSA and revealed it to the public via newspapers and mass
media. This incident was reported as the biggest US intelligence leakage, and
has caused increased concern amongst governments and companies. More-
over, there exist various security measures for outsider threats, which is not
the case for insider threats, such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection/Prevention
Systems (IDS/IPS), and antiviruses.
The continuous streaming of insider threat data generated from various
sources (e.g. security logs, traffic data, web requests, and email headers) in-
creases the volume and velocity of this data acquisition. To handle the big
data streams and detect insider threats, several machine learning approaches
have been developed, however, they still suffer from a high number of false
alarms. None of those approaches addressed the insider threat problem from
the perspective of stream mining data where a concept drift or an outlier
is an indication of an insider threat. We can recognize two types of drifts: a
normal drift and a concept drift. A normal drift is the change in data distribu-
tion over time; the normal change in user’s behaviour over time according to
tasks assigned, developed knowledge level and other elements [24]. A concept
drift may manifest in different patterns such as sudden/abrupt, incremental,
gradual, and reoccurring concepts [9]. The focus of this paper is on outliers
which refer to anomalous behaviour that deviates from the normal baseline
of user’s behaviour or community (i.e. a group of users having the same role)
behaviour.
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Hence, we present RandSubOut (Random Subspace Outliers) approach
for insider threat detection over real-time data streaming. The idea is to con-
struct an ensemble of p+1 outlier detection base learners, including p learners
over random subspaces of feature pairs and one learner over all feature space.
RandSubOut allows the detection of insider threats represented as localised
outliers in random feature subspaces, which would not be the case over the
whole feature space. The main contributions of this paper are summarised as
follows:
• extraction of new feature types from the synthetic insider threat data by
CMU-CERT 1 [11] to generate community behaviour profiles;
• presentation of RandSubOut for Insider Threat Detection with MCOD
and AnyOut outlier detection base learners;
• detection of insider threats represented as distance-based outliers using
RandSubOut; and
• evaluation of the performance of RandSubOut according to the evaluation
measures including TP and FP.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the
related work. Section 3 introduces some outlier detection methods over a data
stream and describes RandSubOut for Insider Threat Detection. Experiments
and results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper
and suggests future work.
2 Related Work
There exists a significant body of research on applying ML approaches for
detecting insider threats. A great research trend is towards utilising proba-
bilistic and k Nearest Neighbours (k-NN) approaches. The probabilistic ML
approaches include Naive Bayes [25][19], Bayesian Network (BN) [3], and
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [12]. Others chose to combine BN and other
ML algorithms, such as HMM [20] and Stochastic Gradient Boosting [5],
with the aim to improve their models’ performance. While, the k-NN ap-
proaches [7][8][18] are distance-based so any deviation of a user’s behaviour
from her/his normal baseline or the baseline of the community’s behaviour
flags anomalous behaviour. In addition, there exists research on implementing
Fuzzy Inference Systems [24][6] to evaluate the degree of insider threat.
However, neither of those approaches addressed the insider threat prob-
lem from the perspective of stream mining data with concept drift, except for
[16]. Parveen et al. [16] proposed an ensemble of One Class Support Vector
Machine (OCSVM) to model a time series of daily logs. It maintains a k
number of ensemble models having the minimum prediction error. The en-
semble of OCSVM reported higher accuracy and almost half the number of
1 https://www.cert.org/insider-threat/tools/
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false positives compared to traditional OCSVM. The authors extended their
work in a future paper [17] where the ensemble approach was applied on
unsupervised Graph-based Anomaly Detection (GBAD). The results proved
that the ensemble approach based on supervised OCSVM outperformed that
based on unsupervised GBAD which reported a higher false rate.
Parveen’s approach [16] models normal user’s behaviour acquired from
data streams over an ensemble of OCSVM classifiers in order to find a de-
cision boundary between normal class label c = 1 and abnormal class label
c = 0 (i.e. malicious insider threats). However, the idea of RandSubOut is to
detect malicious insider threats represented as distance-based outliers contin-
uously over real-time data streams. It also allows to detect localised outliers
over random feature subspaces which may not be detected over the whole
feature space as addressed in [16]. In addition, the paper [16] evaluated the
proposed approach over 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection data set 2 which
is not specifically developed for insider threat detection. Unlike our approach
RandSubOut which is evaluated over synthetic insider threat data set gener-
ated by CMU-CERT.
3 Outlier based Insider Threat Detection
This section describes an established distance-based outlier detection meth-
ods, as well as the proposed approach RandSubOut utilizing those methods
for insider threat detection.
3.1 Outlier Detection Methods
The state of the art introduces different outlier detection methods over a data
stream. The demonstration paper [10] provides a comparison of four distance-
based outlier detection methods including STORM [1], Abstract-C [22], COD
[13], and MCOD [13]. According to [10], COD and MCOD have lower space
and time requirements than [1] and [22]. Moreover, the experimental evalu-
ation in [10] shows better performance for MCOD compared to COD over
benchmark tested data sets. All of the four algorithms in addition to a fur-
ther distance-based outlier detection method called AnyOut [2] have been
implemented in the open-source tool for Massive Online Analysis (MOA)3 .
Hence, we select MCOD and AnyOut to test their performance on synthetic
insider threat data sets generated by the CERT Division at Carnegie Mellon
2 http://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/1998data.html
3 http://moa.cms.waikato.ac.nz/
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University (CMUCERT). A description of the selected algorithms is provided
below.
MCOD
MCOD (Micro-cluster-based Continuous Outlier Detection) is an event-based
approach that introduces the concept of evolving micro-clusters. The micro-
clusters are the regions containing inlier instances with no overlapping. This
allows to evaluate the range queries for new instance x with respect to the
centers of micro-clusters instead of all the preceding active instances in the
current window w. Thus, reducing the space and time requirements. Let S
represent the set of instances that doesn’t belong to any micro-cluster. For
each new instance x, MCOD selects the center of the nearest micro-cluster c.
If the dist(x, c) ≤ r2 such that r is the distance parameter for outlier detection,
x is assigned to the corresponding micro-cluster. Otherwise, a range query
for x is evaluated with respect to the set S of instances that doesn’t belong
to any micro-cluster. Let b represent the number of neighbours N ⊆ S of x
where ∀n ∈ N, dist(x, n) ≥ r2 and let k represent the number of neighbours
parameter. If b > θk such that parameter θ ≥ 1, then a new micro-cluster
with center x is created and the neighbours N are assigned to this micro-
cluster. A micro-cluster whose size decreases below k + 1 is deleted and a
range query similar to that described for x is performed for each of its former
instances. An instance x is flagged as an outlier, if there exists less than k
instances in either S or in each micro-cluster of center c that satisfies the
following: dist(x, c) ≤ 32r.
AnyOut
AnyOut (Anytime Outlier detection) is a cluster-based approach that sug-
gests a hierarchy of clusters in tree structure named ClusTree where upper
level clusters include fine grained information about lower levels. It represents
a cluster by a Cluster Feature tuple CF = (n,LS, SS), where n is the number
of instances in the cluster, LS and SS are respectively the linear sum and
the squared sum of those instances. The compact structure of the tree using
CF tuples reduces space requirements. The idea of AnyOut is to traverse the
tree in top-down manner and compare the current instance xi to the clusters
at each level until the arrival of new instance xi+1 interrupts the descent
down the tree. At the moment of interruption, it inserts xi to the cluster
node e arrived into in the ClusTree and provides its degree of outlierness.
Thus, maintaining real-time feedback. AnyOut defines two scores to reflect
the degree of outlierness of an instance xi. Mean outlier score is dist(xi, µ(e))
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where µ(e) is the mean of e that xi is inserted to. Density outlier score is
1− gaus(xi, e) where gaus(xi, e) is the Gaussian probability density of xi for
µ(e).
3.2 RandSubOut Approach for Insider Threat
Detection
Features extracted from system and network logs describe the activity of a
community. The deviation of such activity from its normal pattern accord-
ing to a certain determined threshold could correlate to a malicious insider
behaviour [23]. Those features are treated as priori indicators. For example,
increased removable media activity which could correlate to IP theft; logon
after working hours or from a different county location; vast number of file
events like downloads, uploads, or email forwards. Another indicator is re-
lated to text categorization where specific keywords, phrases or emails could
correlate to malicious insider activities. An illustrative case could be browsed
suspicious websites and on the top of the list is WikiLeaks and job hunting
sites.
The feature space identified in this research consists of a combination of
system and network logs. The feature set assesses each user’s logged activities,
devices, and assigned attribute values. It is categorized into four feature types
sorted according to session slots:
• Frequency-based features (e.g. freq. (i.e. frequency) of logon, freq. of con-
necting a device, freq. of copying files to removable media device, etc.);
• Time-based features (e.g. logon after working hours, device usage after
working hours, duration of connecting a device, etc.);
• Boolean features (e.g. logon from new pc flag= 0,1, email-bcc non-empty,
email-to or -cc or -bcc include a non-employee, etc.);
• Attribute-based features (e.g. freq. of visiting a particular URL, freq. of
sending emails to a particular user, etc.).
We propose an approach for insider threat detection named RandSubOut
(Random Subspace Outliers). The aim of RandSubOut is based on detecting
localised outliers in random subspaces of feature pairs. Those localised out-
liers represent insider threats, which would not be detected over the whole
feature space. For instance, let f represent the number of features and p = f
represent the number of feature subspaces. The idea is to construct an ensem-
ble of p+ 1 base learners, including p learners over random feature subspaces
and one learner over all feature space. Each learner in the ensemble will build
a model, so based on a voting mechanism of those models, an alarm may be
generated reporting a malicious insider threat. In the following, a detailed
description of RandSubOut is provided.
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Over each feature subspace:
At each window slide wIter, RandSubOut creates an outlier temporal list
OutTempList of the detected outliers OutSet, each associated with a tem-
poral factor tempF and the window slide wIter. A temporal factor tempF
counts the number of windows that the outlier survived in (i.e. the outlier
did not turn into an inlier). For example, if an outlier out ∈ OutTempList
remains as an outlier at next window slide wIter + 1, tempF associated to
out is incremeted by 1.
RandSubOut then creates a list of flag alerts SubF lagAlertList associated
to the window slides wIter for the corresponding feature subspace. A flag
alert flagAlert is a boolean variable assigned to {0, 1}. We define a vouch
factor vouchF as a parameter which confirms whether an outlier is a positive
(i.e. a malicious insider threat). At each window slide wIter, we check if
tempF = vouchF , then the outlier survived for a vouchF number of windows
and flagAlert is assigned 1 for the window slide wIter that the outlier is
confirmed as a positive at. Thus, minimizing the number of false alarms (i.e.
false flag alerts). Algorithm 1 gives a a pseudo code to describe the steps of
the procedure over each feature subspace. Note that outMethod represents
the distance-based outlier detection method utilized as a base learner. This
refers to either MCOD or AnyOut in this paper.
Over the ensemble of random feature subspaces:
In total, RandSubOut creates a list of votes EnsembleV oteList which counts
the number of times a flagAlert is assigned to 1 at each window slide wIter
over all the random feature subspaces. This count is maintained in a variable
vote. Let voteF represent a vote factor which confirms whether a flag alarm
should be generated as a total vote of the ensemble. If vote ≥ voteF , then
a an alarm is generated at this window slide wIter. A description for the
procedure over the ensemble of random feature subspaces is provided in a
pseudo code in Algorithm 2.
4 Experiments
In this section, we present the experiments performed to evaluate RandSub-
Out with MCOD and AnyOut based learners over CMU-CERT data. The
results are displayed and discussed in order to select the optimal tuned pa-
rameters for detecting malicious insider threat represented as outliers.
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Algorithm 1 Over each feature subspace
1: wIter ← 0
2: found← 0
3: while nbrProcInst < nbrInst do
4: outMethod.process(newInst)
5: if (nbrProcInst mod w) = 0 then
6: OutSet← outMethod.getOutliersFound()
7: for Outlier out : OutSet do
8: if out ∈ OutTempList.getOutliers() then
9: tempF ← OutTempList.getOutTuple(out).getTempF()
10: OutTempList.getOutTuple(out).setTempF(tempF + 1)
11: found← 1
12: end if
13: if found = 0 then
14: tempF ← 1
15: OutTempList.addOutTuple(out, tempF , wIter)
16: end if
17: end for
18: for Outlier out ∈ OutTempList.getOutliers() do
19: if OutTempList.getOutTuple(out).getTempF()= vouchF then






26: outWIter ← OutTempList.getOutTuple(out).getWIter()





32: wIter ← wIter + 1
33: end if
34: end while
Algorithm 2 Over the ensemble of random feature subspaces
1: for FeatureSubspace FSubspace : FeatureSpace do
2: for WindowIterSlide wIter : SubFlagAlertList.getWIters() do
3: tempV ote← EnsembleVoteList.getVote(wIter)
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4.1 Experimental Setup
We extracted a set of the features defined previously from the CMU-CERT
data sets. This feature set builds up a community behaviour profile for each
community (e.g. computer programmers, mathematicians, test engineers,etc.)
sorted according to session slots. A session slot is per 4 hours to handle the
detection of insider threat as soon as possible near to real-time. Since the
range of feature values varies widely, we performed feature scaling in the
range of [0, 1].
As discussed before, a malicious insider threat may manifest in different
patterns of concept drift or an outlier which is the focus of this paper. We
consider a malicious insider threat scenario that maps to outliers, where a
user uses a USB drive at markedly higher rate than previous activity to
steal data. The total number of instances nbrInst = 3000 in a community
behaviour model represents the number of session slots. The period of the
malicious insider threat scenario maps to a start at lowerBound = 922 and
an end at upperBound = 1323.
We evaluated RandSubOut as an ensemble of MCOD base learners and
an ensemble of AnyOut base learners according to TP (i.e. true alarms that
correlate to malicious insider threat) and FP (i.e. false alarms that correlate
to normal instances detected as outliers) measures.
For MCOD, Table 1 displays a description of the tuned parameters. For
AnyOut, the experiments revealed that varying the values of the parameters
trainSetSize, confAggr, conf , and threshold does not have a significant
effect on the results, so they were assigned to fixed values. However, we tuned
other parameters as described in Table 2.
Table 1 MCOD Tuned Parameters.
k = {50, 60, 70} number of neighbours parameter
r = {0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7} distance parameter for outlier detection
w = {100, 150, 200} window size
Table 2 AnyOut Tuned Parameters.
trainSetSize = 500 training set size
confAggr = 2 size of confidence aggregate
conf = 4 initial confidence value
threshold = 0.4 outlier score threshold
oScoreAggr = {2, 8} size of outlier score aggregate
w = {100, 200} window size
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The vouch factor vouchF defined previously is assigned vouchF = 2 for
MCOD, so it confirms whether an outlier is a positive after it survives for 2
window slide iterations. However, it is tuned to vouchF = {2, 4} for AnyOut,
because it affects the results, which is not the case for MCOD where no flag
alarms are generated then. The vote Factor voteF is assigned voteF = 2, so
it confirms whether a flag alarm should be generated as a total vote of the
ensemble.
4.2 Results and Discussion
Fig. 1 TP votes generated by RandSubOut with MCOD over w = 100.
Fig.1, Fig.2, and Fig.3 show the number of TP votes generated by Rand-
SubOut using MCOD base learners over window size w = 100, w = 150,
and w = 200 respectively with varying values of parameters k and r. Note
that the parameters which didn’t show TP votes are not displayed in fig-
ures. The window slide iteration wIter ends at the number of processed
instances nbrProcInst and starts at nbrProcInst − w (e.g. for w = 100,
the first window slide iteration wIter = 1 ends at nbrProcInst = 100
and starts at nbrProcInst − w = 0). In order to satisfy real-time or near
real-time detection of a malicious insider threat (i.e. TP), we should con-
sider the flag alarms generated at real-time or near real-time. For instance,
in Fig.1, if vouchF = 2, then a flag alarm of TP votes should be gener-
ated between lowerV ouchBound = ceil(lowerBound+w× (vouchF − 1)) =
floor(922 + 100× 1) = 1100 and upperV ouchBound = floor(upperBound+
w × vouchF ) = ceil(1323 + 100 × 1) = 1500. Fig.1 shows that the alarms
started to be flagged at lowerV ouchBound = 1100, however more flag alarms
Outlier Detection in Random Subspaces over Data Streams
Fig. 2 TP votes generated by RandSubOut with MCOD over w = 150.
Fig. 3 TP votes generated by RandSubOut with MCOD over w = 200.
are generated after upperV ouchBound = 1500. This is justified by that in-
stances assigned as inliers by RandSubOut may turn into outliers after a
number of window slide iterations. In MCOD, an instance may not belong
to any micro-cluster but still is an inlier, thus considered a potential out-
lier. RandSubOut considers a flag alarm as a true if it signals a vote ≥ voteF
and it is generated between lowerV ouchBound and upperV ouchBound. This
means that at least two feature subspaces voted for a flag alarm at this win-
dow slide iteration wIter. Thus, minimizing the number of false alarms. To
select the optimal parameter values, we consider the parameter values which
satisfies a true flag alarms ONLY generated between lowerV ouchBound
and upperV ouchBound. Fig. 1 for k = 60, r = 0.5, w = 100 reports a
true alarm with vote ≥ voteF ; voteF = 2 at nbrProcInst = 1500 (i.e.
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Fig. 4 TP votes generated by RandSubOut with AnyOut over w = 100.
Fig. 5 TP votes generated by RandSubOut with AnyOut over w = 200.
wIter = nbrProcInst ÷ w = 1500 ÷ 100 = 15 such that wIter starts at 0).
Also, Fig. 2 for k = 70, r = 0.4, w = 150 reports a true alarm with vote ≥ 2
for TP = 1 at nbrProcInst = 1350, where lowerV ouchBound = 1200
and upperV ouchBound = 1500 (i.e. wIter = 9). However, no case in
Fig.3 satisfies the condition of a true flag alarm ONLY generated between
lowerV ouchBound and upperV ouchBound with vote ≥ voteF ; voteF = 2
for TP = 1.
Similarly, Fig.4, and Fig. 5 show the number of TP votes generated by
RandSubOut using AnyOut base learners over window size w = 100, and w =
200 respectively with varying values of parameters oScoreAggr and vouchF .
It is clear that no case in both figures satisfies the condition of a true flag
alarm ONLY generated between lowerV ouchBound and upperV ouchBound
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Fig. 6 TP votes vs. FP votes generated
by RandSubOut with MCOD over w =
100.
Fig. 7 TP votes vs. FP votes generated by
RandSubOut with MCOD over w = 150.
with vote ≥ voteF ; voteF = 2. Moreover, the results revealed flag alarms with
a great number of votes which do not map to the malicious insider threat
scenario. For instance, the worst case of vote = 14 implies that 14 feature
subspaces voted for this flag alarm as true, so approximately 14 or less random
features reported a malicious insider threat which is not the case. Mapping
to the malicious insider threat scenario considered, only few features such
as freq. of connecting a device and freq. of copying files to removable media
device would only report a malicious insider threat. The reason behind those
unstatisfying results would correlate to that an outlier score of an instance xi
is computed once a new instance xi+1 arrives. This means that the processing
is interrupted and the confidence of the outlier score computed would be very
low.
Based on the above experiments, we select two cases of RandSubOut with
MCOD base learners. The first case for k = 60, r = 0.5, w = 100 is reported in
Fig. 6 showing the TP votes vs. FP votes with respect to processed instances.
The second case for k = 70, r = 0.4, w = 150 is reported in Fig. 7 showing
the TP votes vs. FP votes with respect to processed instances. Fig. 6 flags
a true alarm with vote = 2 for TP = 1 and a false alarm with vote = 2 for
FP = 1 at nbrProcInst = 1500. However, Fig. 7 only flags a true alarm
with vote = 2 for TP = 1 at nbrProcInst = 1350, but it didn’t flag any false
alarm with vote ≥ 2. Thus, in this case FP = 0 where no false alarms are
generated. Hence, the vote goes to RandSubOut with MCOD base learners
for k = 70, r = 0.4, w = 150, vouchF = 2, voteF = 2.
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5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of high number of false alarms in the
existing insider threat detection approaches from the perspective of stream
mining data where a concept drift is an indication of an insider threat. We
present RandSubOut approach for insider threat detection over real-time
data streaming. RandSubOut allows to detect insider threats represented
as localised outliers over random feature subspaces, which may not be de-
tected over the whole feature space. It also introduces two parameters: a
vouch factor to confirm whether a flag alarm should be generated over a
feature subspace, and a vote factor to confirm whether a flag alarm should
be generated as a total vote of the ensemble. We evaluated RandSubOut
as an ensemble of MCOD and AnyOut outlier detection methods, accord-
ing to evaluation measures including TP and FP. The experiments revealed
that RandSubOut with MCOD base learners outperforms RandSubOut with
AnyOut base learners. Moreover, RandSubOut with MCOD base learners for
k = 70, r = 0.4, w = 150vouchF = 2, voteF = 2 provided the best results,
where it votes for true alarms with vote ≥ 2 for TP = 1 at real-time or near
real-time. In this case, the votes for FP are ≤ 2, so no false alarms were
generated.
Future work will be to address malicious insider threat scenarios that map
to the different patterns of concept drift other than outliers. It will also tackle
how to distinguish between a normal drift and a concept drift over real-time
data streaming.
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